Influência do Ataque do Testemunho Mentiroso nos Modelos de Reputação

Fabiana Martins da SilvaJosé Ferreira de Rezende

The lying witness attack to the reputationm-based cooperation incentive schemes happens when a peer asks for information about a provider for a witness who answers with false information that would influenciate him to interact with a misbehaved provider or to prevent him to interact with a good provider. Besides to an isolated action, lying witnesses may form a collusion to increase the harm caused by their attack. This work analyses how each reputation-based mathematic method is sensitive to this attack and dependent of an extra mechanism, i.e. credibility mechanisms, to guarantee a better performance in environments where this attack may occur.

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Biblioteca Digital Brasileira de Computação - Contato:
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