A Simple Intrusion-Tolerant Reliable Multicast Protocol using the TTCB

Lau Cheuk LungMiguel CorreiaNuno Ferreira NevesPaulo Veríssimo

This paper proposes a simple reliable multicast protocol that tolerates arbitrary faults, including malicious faults such as intrusions. The goal is to show a novel way of designing intrusion-tolerant protocols based on a well-founded hybrid fault model. This model is based on a simple distributed security kernel - the TTCB - which is used by the processes only to execute securely critical steps of the protocol. Otherwise, the processes and their communication can be attacked in unlimited ways. The TTCB provides only a few basic services, which allow our protocol to tolerate a number of faults similar to accidental fault-tolerant protocols: for f faults, our protocol requires f + 2 processes, instead of 3f + 1 in typical intrusion-tolerant (or Byzantine) protocols. The protocol exhibits fast termination in the presence of intrusions and/or crash or malicious process failures, since it does not use any cryptography in runtime.

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